Options Study Form A

. (page 3 of 5)

OCC CLEARING HEMBER INFORMATION

Name of firm	SEC file No. 8
7. Please indicate the number of accounts (acclearing member carried in each of the foll	of March 31, 1978) which the
a. Public customer options accounts	Number of accounts
(1) Firm (other than introduced)	<u> </u>
(2) Introduced (fully disclosed)	
(3) Omnibus (number of firms)	
· b. All other public customer accounts	
c. Options specialist-market makers	The state of the s
d. Equity specialist-market makers	-
e. Combined equity-options specialist- market makers	
f. Registered options traders	
g. Registered equity traders	
h. Combined registered equity- options traders	-
i. Options floor broker accounts	
j. Other broker-dealer(s) proprietary omni options accounts	bus
k. Customer accounts introduced to another broker-dealer(1) Fully disclosed	•
(2) Canibus	
 Please provide sample copies of all starts of account, included in 7 c. through 7 carries. Please include the firm's name 	i. above, that the clearing morehor
1/ If possible, provide the number of in	dividual customer options accounts
carried by the clearing member in all	omnibus accounts:

Options Study Form A

(page 4 of 5)

OCC CLEARING MEMBER INFORMATION

	(a)	(b)	(C) Market value	(a)	(e)
Trade date	Long cotion positions	Short option positions	Long under- lying equity positions	Short under- lying equity positions	Gross error account 2/
1978-Apr 7		***************************************		<u> </u>	
14	·	•			-
. 17					
21 .				·	
28				-	•
<i>⊻</i> .	have a position	in a class of ing securities,	period covered, to options in which do not include the	it had a proprie	etary position
. 2/	Including "outsimilar account		ense or differenc or short position		ny other
9. Please pro	vide the market f the clearing n	value of short member as of:	option positions	in the proprieta	згу
		December 31,	1976		
		December 31,	1976	*****	

Options Study Form A

(page 5 of 5)

OCC CLEARING MEMBER IMPORTATION

Hame of firm	·	SEC file No. 8-										
accounts	during the	rm cleared spec following perio below, the foll (b) Net capital	ds, please pro	maker or regist yide, as of the (d) 2/ Total (a)(6)	ered options to close of busin (e) <u>3/</u> Aggregate equity	rader ness for (f)2/ Net charges						
	MOT CIT	. ·	capital	& (c)(2)(x) deductions	edatch	to net worth						
•			(OMIT PENNIE	S)								
1976-Mar 31												
Jun 30												
Sep 30				· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	·							
Dec 31	4, ************************************		·									
1977-Har 31		-										
Jun 30		-										
Sep 30	· · · ·	•	·									
Dec 30						-						
1978-Mar 31		·	• •••••	 ,	1							
Apr 17												

 $1\!\!/$ Omit pennies and indicate by n.r. if member was not registered for the date(s) specified.

2/ As defined in 17CFR 240.15c3-1, paragraphs (a)(6) and (c)(2)(x). It should be noted that prior to January 1,1977, the effective date of certain amendments to Rule 15c3-1(c)(2)(x), that section 15c3-1(c)(2)(xi) effectively set forth the deductions for the accounts of registered options traders and that section 15c3-1(a)(6) regarding the 1,000 percent test was not effective until August 1,1977.

3/ In all options specialist-market maker and registered options trader accounts.

Special Study of the Options Markets Attachment to letter dated June 7, 1978

:	Opt	tons Study For	m B			
I. Hame of member		2. s	EC file No. 8-	·	_	
3. Floor member of		₹	•			
- ,	(name of exc	hange)			•	
4. Cleared by	e of firm)	s. s	BC file No. 8-		-	
 Please Indicate form o Indicate the capacity(f doing busine s) in which th	e member is re	gistered:	•		
Options specialist	Options mark	et maker	Options trad	erOpt	legioning enoi	member
8. To the extent a firm Option posi		these periods Underlying s		the market vi Equity or	alue of followi	ng: Net(a)(6)
Trade Long	Short	positions	Short	(deficit)) &/cr(c)(2)(x)
date		Long	Short		deductions2/	charges to clearing
						member 2/3/
1975-Dec 31						
1576-Jan 15						
Jan 30						
Mar 31						
Jun 30						
Sep 30						
				•		
		-				
1977-Mar 31						
Jun 30						
Sep 30						
Dec 30						
1978-Mar 31						
Apr. 12						
Apr 13			•			
Apr 14		•			•	
Арг 17:						-
						
Apr 18				<u> </u>		
Apr 19						
Apr 20						
Apr 21						·
Apr 24			·			

^{1/} Omit-pennies and indicate by n.r. if member was not registered for the date(s) specified.

^{2/} As defined in 17CFR 240.15c3-1, paragraphs (a)(6) and (c)(2)(x). It should be noted that prior to January 1,1977, the effective date of certain arendments to Rule 15c3-1(c)(2)(x), that section 15c3-1(c)(2)(xi) effectively set forth the deductions for the accounts of registered options traders.

 $^{{\}it y}$ II excess equity, state amount in parenthes!s.

Exhibit 5

TABLE 1

All Options Exchanges Floor Participants Equity by Size: 1976-1978*

	Deficit	0 - 4,999	(Amounts in Thous 5,000 - 24,999	sands of Dollars) 25,000 - 99,999	100,000 &	Total
	No. Amount	No. Amount	No. Amount	No Amount	Over No. Amount	No. Amount
76 Dec 31	48 (679)	253 394	212 2,594	170 8,695	135 69,488	818 81,172
77 Dec 30	45 (579)	272 371	219 2,766	214 11,021	154 70,153	904 84,310
78 Mar 31	33 (441)	246 359	219 2,833	209 10,889	158 71,635	865 85,716
78 Apr 13	33 (483)	244 380	230 3,078	213 11,370	152 71,061	872 85,890
78 Apr 14	48 (751)	237 365	228 3,017	215 11,281	142 71,600	870 86,262
78 Apr 17	85 (2,341)	232 372	220 2,899	209 10,670	129 62,724	875 76,664
78-Apr 18	68 (2,022)	230 359	237 3,113	208 10,890	129 64,084	872 78,446
78 Apr 24	58 (2,083)	232 352	230 2,932	215 10,898	133 66,893	868 81,076

^{*}Does not include options specialists, registered traders or market makers that are not subject to 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(a)(6) or (c)(2)(x).

AMEX Options Specialists and Registered Traders Equity by Size: 1976 - 1978*

	Deficit	0 - 4,999	(Amounts in Thou 5,000 - 24,999	usands of Dollars) 25,000 - 99,999	100,000 & Over	Total
	No. Amount	No. Amount	No. Amount	No. Amount	No. Amount	No. Amount
76 Dec 31	1 (35)	0 0	8 174	36 1,998	45 21,128	90 23,301
77 Dec 30	3 (135)	0 0	21 406	70 3,498	54 30,620	148 34,524
78 Mar 31	3 (130)	0 0	26 50 ⁴	60 2,958	59 32,715	147 36,177
78 Apr 13	3 (131)	0 0	27 537	64 3,570	54 31,783	148 35,890
78 Apr 14	4 (290)	1 *	30 556	63 3,522	50 30,464	148 34,542
78 Apr 17	10 (834)	3 8	23 439	64 3,558	48 28,957	148 32,961
78 Apr 18	8 (751)	4 8	24 467	64 3,652	47 28,714	147 32,841
78 Apr 24	11 (921)	2 5	21 425	64 3,538	50 29,975	148 33,943

^{*} Less than \$500.

^{*}Does not include options specialists or traders that are not subject to 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(a)(6) or (c)(2)(x).

CBOE Options Market Maker Equity by Size: 1976 - 1978*

	Deficit	0 - 4,999	(Amounts in Thous 5,000 - 24,999	ands of Dollars) 25,000 - 99,999	100,000 & Over	Total
	No. Amount	No. Amount	No. Amount	No. Amount	No. Amount	No. Amount
76 Dec 31	36 (612)	203 280	165 2,053	126 6,323	81 45,308	611 53,963
77 Dec 30	35 (401)	225 302	161 1,924	122 6,532	93 37,026	636 45,784
78 Mar 31	23 (273)	210 305	154 1,843	128 6,856	92 37,321	608 46,325
78 Apr 13	24 (319)	208 328	168 2,100	126 6,791	90 37,970	616 47,189
78 Apr 14	36 (425)	201 304	164 2,058	128 6,688	86 39,953	615 49,003
78 Apr 17	68 (1,226)	194 300	162 2,032	123 6,098	75 32,568	622 40,998
78 Apr 18	52 (1,010)	191 293	178 2,244	123 6,292	76 34,167	620 42,996
78 Apr 24	39 (902)	198 298	175 2,104	128 6,393	75 35,479	615 44,274

^{*}Does not include market makers which are not subject to 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(a)(6) or (c)(2)(x).

MSE Options Market Makers Equity by Size: 1976 - 1978*

	Deficit	0 - 4,99		unts in Thousand - 24,999		Dollars) D - 99,999	10	0,000 &	,	Total
	No. Amoun	t No. Amou	nt No.	Amount	No.	Amount	No	Over Amount	No	. Amount
76 Dec 31	5 (12)	37 80	28	266	3	109	0	0	73	455
77 Dec 30	6 (28)	34 52	19	190	9	344	2	809	76	1,395
78 Mar 31	5 (19)	24 35	24	267	10	472	1	323	64	1,096
78 Apr 13	5 (18)	26 40	20 :	237	10	464	1	322	62	1,063
78 Apr 14	5 (18)	26 _. 44	19	210	11	524	1	343	62	1,121
78 Apr 17	5 (18)	24 38	20 2	219	11	539	1	350	61	1,146
78 Apr 18	5 (18)	24 34	22 2	247	10	526	1	345	62	1,152
78 Apr 24	4 (18)	24 38	20	194	11	493	2	463	61	1,188

^{*}Does not include market makers that are not subject to 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(a)(6) or (c)(2)(x).

PSE Options Market Makers Equity by Size: 1976 - 1978*

					(An	ounts in The	ousands o	of Dollars)					
	D	eficit	0 -	4,999	5,00	0 - 24,999	25,	000 - 99,999	100	0,000 & Over		Total	
	No	. Amount	No.	Amount	No	. Amount		No. Amount	No	. Amount	No	. Amount	
76 Dec 31	6	(20)	12	32	11	101	2	141	3	1,844	34	2,118	
77 Dec 30	0	(0).	9	15	14	181	8	402	3	1,317	34	1,915	
78 Mar 31	0	(0)	10	16	10	130	9	393	4	1,074	33	1,614	
78 Apr 13	υ	(0)	8	9	10	123	10	370	4	649	33	1,152	773
78 Apr 14	2	(5)	7	10	12	160	8	305	3	446	32	920	
78 Apr 17	1	(250)	9	19	11	146	8	352	2	300	31	817	ν,
78 Apr 18	1	(227)	9	17	11	127	7	268	3	411	31	823	
78 Apr 24	2	(230)	8	11	10	143	8	307	3	393	31	854	

^{*}Does not include options market makers that are not subject to 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(a)(6) or (c)(2)(x).

PHLX Options Specialists & Registered Traders Equity by Size: 1976 - 1978*

	D∈	eficit	0 -	4,999		ounts in Thousar 0 - 24,999		of Dollars) 000 - 99,999		,000 &	,	r otal
	No.	Amount	No.	Amount	No	. Amount	N	lo. Amount		Amount	No.	Amount
76 Dec 31	0	(0)	1	1	0	0	3	124	6	1,209	10	1,335
77 Dec 30	1	(14)	4	1	4	65	5	245	2	380	16	692
78 Mar 31	2	(20)	2	3	5	88	3	212	1	202	13	505
78 Apr 13	1	(15)	2	3	5	80	3	175	2	338	13	596
78 Apr 14	1	(12)	2	7	3	34	5	242	2	394	13	678
78 Apr 17	1	(13)	2	6	4	62	3	124	3	549	13	741
78.Apr 18	2	(15)	2	8	2	27	4	153	2	447	12	635
78 Apr 24	2	(12)	0	0	4	65	4	168	3	583	13	816

^{*}Does not include options specialists or registered traders that are not subject to 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(a)(6) or (c)(2)(x).

Exhibit 6

Options Exchange Floor Participants Equity Requirements: 1976 - 1978

(Amounts in Thousands of Dollars)

	Equity	Equity Requirements	Charges to Market Maker Clearing Firms
76 Dec 31	81,172	45,785	8,751
77 Dec 30	84,310	64,478	11,916
78 Mar 31	85,716	58,992	9,968
78 Apr 13	85,890	63,381	12,256
78 Apr 14	86,262	66,437	16,265
78 Apr 17	76,664	66,089	21,049
78 Apr 18	78,446	62,723	15,862
78 Apr 24	81,076	56,080	11,614

77.

Exhibit 7

BOARD OF GOVERNORS

STOOL STOOL

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20551

DIVIBION OF BANKING BUPERVISION AND REGULATION

December 5, 1978

Mr. Richard L. Teberg
Director - Special Study of
the Options Market
Securities and Exchange Commission
500 North Capitol Street
Washington, D. C. 20549

Dear Dick:

This is in response to your letter, dated October 25, 1978 in which you discussed the use of the Black-Scholes option pricing model (the "delta model") as a method for determining the amount of an underlying stock held by an options marketmaker which could constitute a bona-fide hedge for purposes of the specialist credit requirements of Regulation T. With regard to this matter you enclosed for our consideration a paper reviewing the potential applications of the "delta model," which was prepared by the Commission's Directorate of Economic Policy and Research.

At your request the Board's staff reviewed this paper along with a number of other studies regarding the use of the "delta model" as a risk management device. After careful study and analysis we have concluded that it would be inappropriate to include the model as part of the specialist credit provisions of Regulation T.

As you are aware, we are concerned that the level of underlying stock held in a marketmaker's account not be excessive in terms of that required by the marketmaker to fulfill his marketmaking function in accordance with the objectives of Regulation T. These objectives insofar as they relate to the use of preferential credit by specialists, were first spelled out by the Board in discussions with the New York Stock Exchange regarding its request that preferential credit be given specialists on that exchange. In considering the exchange's request the Board stated:

Mr. Richard L. Teberg

In applying the Board's guidelines regarding the use of specialist's credit to the purchase and sale of the underlying stock by option marketmakers the staff has taken the position that preferential credit is available only when such transactions are related to the needs of the market and is unavailable in circumstances solely where the marketmaker desires to minimize the risk in his account. In this regard the staff believes that the use of the "delta model" would not reduce the use of preferential credit in connection with the purchase and sale of the underlying security but, in fact, may tend to increase it as marketmakers attempt to invest in optimal risk-minimizing strategies which may be unrelated to their responsibilities to the public market. This problem would be especially acute in circumstances where the marketmaker held an underlying securities position which had decreased in value. Under such circumstances the marketmaker, might be reluctant to dispose of that position in the event it no longer served as a bona-fide hedge. Rather, in an attempt to minimize his costs, he would prefer to initiate transactions in options to re-establish his hedge without considering fully the needs of the public market. Furthermore, since exchange rules generally restrict a customer's ability to purchase or sell out of the money options, in circumstances where marketmakers initiated transactions in these securities to re-establish a hedge, the use of a "delta model" would have the added drawback of increasing the relative amount of professional trading in an option series with questionable benefits accruing to the investing public.

The staff is also concerned that the use of the "delta model" as a formalized part of Regulation T would sharpen the conflict which the staff believes currently exists between a marketmaker's obligation to the market he serves and his desire to become "delta neutral" in order to minimize his risk. As indicated above the specialist credit provisions of Regulation T were adopted to assist the marketmaker in performing his marketmaking function. We understand that one of the marketmaker's principal obligations in performing his function is to take risks "against the market". Incorporation of the

Letter of the Board to Emil Schram, President of the New York Stock Exchange dated March 14, 1949.

Mr. Richard L. Teberg

"delta model" into the specialist credit provisions of Regulation T would appear to discourage a marketmaker from assuming these risks since if he did so, he might break his "delta neutrality" and increase his margin requirement.

In summary it is the staff's view that the application of the "delta model" in the area of specialist's credit would be inconsistent with the overall objectives of Regulation T. The staff recognizes of course that the risk minimizing attributes of the "delta model" make it attractive for purposes of the uniform net capital rule should the Commission staff desire to apply the model in this area.

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on this matter and hope that our comments are useful to you. If you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to call.

Very truly yours,

Robert S. Plotkin Assistant Director