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I omit the usual sermon on the social responsibilities of great corporations. Their first--and presently most pressing--responsibility is to do the jobs and produce the goods and services on which their customers and constituencies have come to depend. They must make and sell their products better, more honestly, more dependably, with less waste, pollution, ugliness and damage than heretofore. Corporations which manufacture unserviced household appliances, or oil or electric heaters that fail in cold weather, or automobiles so sloppily put together that the car not be depended on, or ice-chests whose handles fall off, or air conditioners and television sets that won't work within three months after sale, are failing in their primary social responsibility. At date of writing cleanup in this respect is urgently needed in a great many lines of corporate operations. If a bill of particulars is needed, try U.S. News & World Report for last January 22 at page 60. I think every American corporate management ought quickly to appoint an internal operations review committee charged with making a blunt report and with developing honest and workmanlike products. Smooth talking and public relations letters will no longer do. (You can write the rest of the sermon yourself without trouble.)

Obviously corporations must also so handle their operations as to be of greatest benefit and least damage to the communities in which they carry on operations. These elementary necessities only open the discussion.

§1.

My thesis here is that the social responsibility of corporations can only be determined by a thorough understanding of the results of the concentrated corporate organization of American

industry. They arise from the widespread use of privileges and powers given to corporations by law. To be understood, the results must be analyzed in terms of their impact on several fields, notably three: economic, sociological, and (in the classical sense of the word) political. This means that while lawyers construct the organization, three companion disciplines must be called in to assess the effect of the corporate institutions--economics, sociology and political science.

With such assessment, the social responsibilities resting on--or perhaps to be imposed on--corporations become more evident.

1. The corporation as an institution

The corporation, like any permanent organization of men, is an institution--in the corporate case, sanctioned, if not encouraged, by law. The background goes beyond mere historical interest.

The right of a number of men to associate themselves into a corporate body was a privilege granted by the Crown of England. To this entity could be added powers and privileges not within the reach of any individual. It could have perpetual existence--whereas a man has only a limited life. It could have shares of stock which could choose a board of directors and management, an arrangement difficult to work out if the associates were numerous. It could incur debts--but these debts applied only to the property of the corporation and did not become liabilities of the associates or stockholders. It could hold property--conceivably to an unlimited degree--and could carry on business operations, conceivably of every nature.

Other privileges could be added--such as the grant of monopoly to run a railroad or bridge or the equivalent but we may disregard these. The simple privileges above given were enough in the twentieth century to change the entire organization of the economy.

Without the privilege of long or unlimited existence, all operations were limited by the span of a man's life. Now it became possible to engage in operations for limitless time without their being liquidated when the organizing generation died. The possibility of accumulating property meant that the aggregate thus constructed could stretch out its ownership virtually without limitation. More fundamental, indeed, was a power which had crept in--that of virtually perpetual accumulation. Corporations aside, men might put their property in trust--and the trust might be allowed to accumulate and combine its income and profits--but it could be liquidated after a lifetime plus twenty-one years--"A life or lives in being and twenty-one years thereafter" was the old rule against perpetuities. But a corporation with unlimited life, not required to distribute its profits, could, unless limited, accumulate forever. Finally, an unlimited number of stockholders could delegate management of a property and operations thus constituted to very few men--today a board of directors which in turn chooses the executive officers.

Whereas before property-holding and property-management had been seen as the accumulation of private fortune, constructed around individuals, now the potential was created of a body of assets of property and operations capable of lasting forever. The corporation as an entity owned property but the wealth represented by it was split among as many shareholders as the corporation cared to have. This meant, among other things, that property could be accumulated in the corporation while the wealth it represented could be split into shares, distributed among many--or in the case of the largest corporation--several million shareholders (AT&T has about 3 1/4 million shareholders today).

None of these effects were foreseen when the British kings began to grant corporate charters. They were, however, foreseen when, after the American Revolution, the several states succeeded to the Crown power of granting corporate charters. Our great grandfathers granted

charters sparingly--by special act of legislature--and endeavored to forestall more of the effects which are now appreciated. Most corporations were thus granted life for a specific number of years--twenty or thirty--and the amount of property they could hold was limited to a few thousand or perhaps a few hundred thousand dollars; they were also commonly limited to a single purpose or business--running a grist mill, or a textile factory, or the like. But a business is not readily limited: it grows. Presently the first group of charters had to be amended by the legislature to prevent liquidating the enterprises. In due course, with the State of New Jersey leading the way, general Acts permitted corporations to be organized by filing appropriate papers in a state office, which might provide that the life of the corporation was perpetual and that it might engage in any business or operation not forbidden by law. While I know of no case on the subject, I suppose that today any individuals resident in any state have a constitutional right to form a corporation, since privileges granted to anyone today must be granted to everyone under the "equal protection of the law" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Striking off the shackles which limited the corporation in size and operation were not easy. Stout individuals were afraid of vast corporations roving the country, buying as they chose, using vast aggregations of capital to accumulate the businesses and properties of individuals. Our grandfathers, in brief, were afraid of exactly what has happened. They thought the unlimited corporation would spell the end of individual enterprise. In fact, they were not too far wrong. Currently, most of the non-agricultural business of the United States is carried on by about 1,250,000 corporations. An overwhelming majority of these are merely individual enterprises in corporate form but 500 or 600 corporations (out of the 1,250,000) carry on between two-thirds and three-fourths of the non-agricultural economic enterprises of the United States; the American economy in all but a few sectors is dominated by less than a thousand

corporate giants. When, presently, corporations were allowed to buy stock in other corporations, galaxies of enterprise dominated by a single central corporation became possible; they exist today and they do business not only all over the United States but all over the world.

This fact is matter of current international concern. General Charles De Gaulle recently attacked the United States economy as a danger to the continued independence of the French economy, while the best selling French book--“The American Challenge” by Jean Jacques Servan Schreiber--discusses means of meeting the attack. He thinks American business has managed to become the main beneficiary of the European market by creating a net-work of European subsidiaries.

The law permits, and lawyers have constructed, these institutions. It is not even a complicated process. The corporation may be organized, may be authorized to issue large amounts of stock which in turn elect a management, and start in. A limited amount of capital is gathered; a business is organized. The business makes profits; these are not distributed to shareholders but plowed back into the business. This increases the value of the outstanding shares of stock--and more. It makes possible the purchase of other assets of business by issuing shares of stock for them. The cycle is started, the machine is in action. Half a century later we may find the same corporation grown to huge size--General Motors and General Electric are two examples out of many.

Meantime a country which first suspected and then endured, finally embraced the corporate system. It came to depend on the large corporations in each field to supply its needs--for copper and steel, for motors and electronics, for process foods and household appliances--for pretty much everything Americans demand for their daily life. Lawyers have devised institutions

and attend to the mechanics of running their organizations hence the great field of corporation law, my own trade.

§2. The discipline of economics

And yet no lawyer, using all of his case books and minutes of regulations has the tools to understand what is going on. His first need is for an economic analyst. In fact, the functioning of the corporate machines have changed the economic forces in action so radically and fundamentally as to force modification if not complete change of economic theory.

Economics since the days of Adam Smith and his successor, Ricardo, considered itself primarily concerned with markets--exchange of goods and services for money, at price levels all under the assumption that market place was the prime influence and the prices reached by the market place were the result of competition of many units--many thousands of units would be a fairer description. But now the situation changes. Obviously there is little or no competition within a single corporation or corporate complex. As the big corporations developed, each of them became a kind of enclave. Their manifold businesses did not compete with each other for raw material--a central purchasing department did the work. Presently it might encounter other vast enclaves whose purchasing departments were also in the market--this was a variety of competition perhaps but one in which most of the enclaves knew about what they could afford to pay or wanted to pay for the supplies they bought. In selling, the corporation attempts to sell its product at a uniform price to all customers, and all payees. There are exceptions, but in general corporations endeavor not to have the price of their product determined by competition from within their own selling organization. Legally they are not allowed to restrict resale prices--the wholesaler buying from them retails at any price he chooses. But they can set up guide lines--as any automobile buyer knows. The agents or outlets or dealers expect and ordinarily get a price pretty much based on an understood mark-up over the wholesale price they paid to General Motors or Ford. The competitive price so dear to classical economists was succeeded by the

“administered price” in respect of which economics yet has to develop a choate theory. One hundred years ago, it was thought the public was wronged unless a dozen hawkers bid against each other for his custom. Today this does not occur--and the public seems pretty indifferent about it.

Next it began to appear that the great corporation accumulates its own capital. Because it had to expand--because it needed more capital--it could add a certain amount to the price of its product, thereby increasing its profit with the intent to plow back a part of that profit into its operations. American giant corporations commonly distribute between 50% and 60% of their profits to their shareholders as dividends, retaining from 40% to 50% for purposes of expansion. In one way or another, these calculations account for between two-thirds and three-fourths of the huge amounts (currently they are running around \$150 billion a year) for improvement of their plants, for technical innovation, for financing new adventures and the like.

This was not part of classical economics. Private thrift and savings were supposed to restrict consumption, making funds and production available for capital goods. To some extent, this still holds--but private savings is now a minor factor. Corporate savings--not voluntary but imposed under the price system--supplies the bulk of American capital needs. The “individual investor” is no longer a capital supplier. When individuals buy stock through the markets--as they do by millions--they do not “invest” their savings in a corporate enterprise. They merely buy out a previous shareholder--who may do anything he likes with the money. No longer do “savings” play more than a minor role in capital development. Preponderantly, the great corporations (and let me add a good many smaller ones) generate their own capital. Most of the billions in giant corporations were thus accumulated. This, of course, resulted from the perpetual

accumulation possibilities contained in the legal machine lawyers have worked out--though neither the lawyers nor anyone foresaw the results.

A third result falls only partly in the economic field since it is a sociological phenomenon as well. Individuals own property. But there is a vast difference between "property" conceived as a farm, a forge or a small restaurant and a share of stock. In the first category, the "owner" makes his capital with his work and managerial ability. In the second, he has nothing whatever to say--he is a purely passive wealthholder. In the space of forty years, the character of individual property-holding changed from small enterprises in which the owner made decisions to so-called "financial property" in which he does not. The latest estimate of the New York Stock Exchange indicates that there are some 24 million holders of stock in the United States, and the total value of these holdings runs into several hundred billion of dollars. In 1956, there had been only 8,600,000 stockholders; I have no estimate of the value of their holdings; but the total market value of shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange in 1956 was about 35% of the value listed in 1967. A sophisticated guess is that the value of the shares held by individuals today is more than three times the value held ten years ago; both the number of stockholders and the value of their holdings have about trebled. At the same rate of change, by 1978, we might have 72 million individuals holding stocks. The value of their holdings can only be guessed at but it might well be a trillion and a half dollars.

This figure would be the wealthholding end result of more than one-third of the personal property held by individuals--the estimate is conservative.

Economists have thus to estimate and analyze the results of the change from active to passive property. Already they have become interested in the decision-making process of the large corporations whose greatest single function is the application of capital to current demand--

and necessarily to the economic motives not of many of tens of millions of Americans but of a relatively few thousand corporate officials and decision-makers--of which we are only beginning to have any real comprehension. The first serious attempt since my own "Modern Corporation and Private Property" published in 1932 is that of my old friend, Professor John Kenneth Galbraith of Harvard whose "The New Industrial State" attempts to wrestle with the issue presented. In blunt fact, the corporate machine changed the incidence of economic force--and economic theory has now to catch up.

NOTE:

In 1967 an estimated 23 million persons in the United States owned stock in publicly-owned corporations compared to 8,630,000 in 1956. The value of stocks on the New York Stock Exchange in 1967 amounted to \$600 billion; the value for the companies listed in 1956 was \$219 billion.

§3. The impact of sociology

Sociology, an upstart in the field of social science, has yet to define its philosophy and objectives. It has made notable progress in describing certain phenomena, and in debating classifications. It has not yet proceeded to the point of working out relations between described phenomena, or a methodology of cause and effect. This is natural in a young discipline. Its preoccupation begins with men in their environment. We may hope that a time will arrive when sociologists can predict with some confidence the effect of environment on individuals. Included in “environment” must be the motivations and dynamics of social processes in which the individual lives and works. Because of this preoccupation, sociology can and one day will contribute to our understanding of the corporate system.

Let us note some of the changes the corporate system has introduced into the lives and environment of most Americans.

As a property-holder, he has changed in a generation and a half from the manager of a small amount of wealth whose use he determined to the holder of corporate securities. As such he has no control whatever over the productive or decision-making process – save that of buying or selling his securities. These carry with them an expectation that he will receive dividends (or, if bonds, interest) and that, especially in the case of stocks, the value of his holding will rise or fall first with the prosperity of the United States and, second, with the commercial success or failure of the corporation. This second factor turns on two elements: the efficiency of the corporate management and the speed with which the enterprises in which it is engaged develop. In some lines, development is more rapid than that of the country as a whole; in others, it keeps even with the national economy; in still others, it may lag behind. But there is nothing the stockholder can do about any of these.

The effect of this change is matter of sociological interest. The life of a village blacksmith was one thing; the life of a worker in a steel plant is clearly different. On the occupational side, therefore, the environment is vastly changed. The preoccupations of an owner of a blacksmith shop were considerable: he had to be craftsman, manager, salesman, as well as architect of a life in which his property--that is, his shop or forge--was bound up with his ownership. Today he may have some shares of stock in the steel company for which he works or for that matter in any one of a couple of thousand corporations. There he can do little except watch the market quotations and hope for favorable economic weather. His preoccupation is with his leisure time and how he shall amuse or develop himself, a second shift in environment, no less important than that of the change a century ago from craftsman to factory employee. Third, as employee, he lives in an organized and highly interdependent world whose routines, procedures are decided for him partly by the corporate executive and partly by his labor union. In both cases, his capacity for individual action and individual decision-making is far less than it was before the advent of the corporate system.

Meantime another result fairly obtrudes itself. In a regime of small businesses, there were literally millions of managers; no one man's decision controlled them. Under the corporate system a handful of men in a couple of thousand corporations at the outside make the major decisions and carry them out through the function of the corporate institution. This has led some sociologists like C. Wright Mills and Dr. William Domhoff to assert that a few thousand men who dominate these institutions "rule" the country. This is obviously untrue; each "rules" (if the word can be used) within his own institution--but these corporate institutions do not caucus, organize themselves, set up institutions and through them decide the fate of the country. C. Wright Mills, a neo-Marxist, was endeavoring in "The Power Elite" to delineate a class against

which he could make war--as Marx had done a century ago. The fiction that the group he described was a "power group" contributed to his argument so he assumed it. Factually, though the group may include powerholders, it does not get together, organize, agree on a policy and on those who execute it. We can discard, therefore, the Mills-Domhoff thesis that the corporate system has, in one large field, erected a ruler-ship group. Talbott Parsons is far sounder in pointing out that power is distributed and my own theory that power requires institutions else it does not succeed I believe to be sound.

Yet we are faced with the existence of a few hundred or perhaps a few thousand power pyramids each operating more or less independently, though constrained by similar circumstances within each industry. The study of the functioning of these institutions, their internal allocation of power, the motivations of the men holding it, becomes of first importance. For one thing, the powerholders within each corporation are not affected by the profit-motive in the same way as was the Liverpool or Manchester merchants. What they do to obtain advancement, larger salaries, perhaps stock options, is quite different from the struggle to buy in the cheapest and sell in the dearest market. The economist has taken a blow here; he must revise his theory. The Sociologist must find out what happens--and how--to men in an administrative pyramid.

These are only a few of the considerations emerging from any square look at the corporate system. Plainly, the sociologist has his work cut out for him.

§4. The contribution of political science.

Political science was the third discipline. Flanking the law which created the corporate institutions, the economist and the sociologist, the political scientist must deal with the corporate system as it becomes an important part of the structure of the United States.

Undeniably corporations are part--and a careful part--of that structure. Societies today provide for the material wants of their peoples either directly through state production and distribution (as in Communist countries) or through a mixed system in which most production and distribution is performed by non-statist enterprise seeking private profit. This is the situation in the United States--though a public sector exists in which needed goods and services are provided by agencies of the state. As we noted, the great bulk of American production and distribution is carried on by a few hundred giant corporations. These are relied on by the community and the state to make available at acceptable prices the wide range of things and services Americans need. The great corporations have become permanent structures in the social system; they are a fact in American life; no analysis of organized life in the United States is valid without including them. The fact that they are not statist, or government agencies, does not mean they can be excluded from description and analysis of the political entity we call America.

This description and analysis is the business of political science. How do corporations fit into the total organization whose apex is the White House, Supreme Court and the powerholders in Congress, and whose base is composed of the workers and consumers of the United States and their families? What is required of the corporate structures? Beyond the minimum requirements what can they be expected to contribute? Should their functions be limited--as our grandfathers wished to do--or should they be expanded? What relation should they have to the state--opponents, servants, partners? I have discussed this relation to some extent in a recent book

("The American Economic Republic," published in 1963) and intend to explore the subject more in depth in a study of power which I hope will be available in less than a year. A few points may be mentioned here by way of illustration--the whole subject is clearly beyond the space and time requirement of this essay.

What is the relation of corporation structures to the state? Theoretically, none. Yet everyone knows that it simply is not so. If the major units in any essential industry--steel, copper, perhaps automobiles--were to shut down or dissolve, the state must either take it over or organize a new one to take its place. By law, the state prescribes that they must not become monopolies but economics and the politics require that the service of supply shall be maintained. Equally, the state can not permit corporations to control elections, parties and candidates, in fact, prohibits corporate contributions to election campaigns. The corporation is expected to remain neutral in the country's chief political processes. Yet at the same time the state is called on to obtain certain results and in obtaining them may need the services of the corporation. Currently the United States government is endeavoring to train masses of illiterate or unskilled individuals excluded from employment by their lack of education or skill. Corporations can organize such programs more effectively than others, hence the state asks their cooperation in the war on poverty.

Third, economists tell us corporations generate their own capital. The application of capital goes far towards determining where and how the country shall be developed. This is a corporate function--yet it impacts with the planning of cities and the encouragement of industry in underdeveloped regions--political decisions in which corporations may assist, or perhaps may be made to conform. Simultaneously eliminating discrimination in employment is a

governmental and political objective--it can be carried out only through employers and the corporate system is a substantial element in employment.

Fourth, innovation and pioneering of new scientific discoveries and techniques is an essential element in the continuous progress. The Federal government finances about two-thirds of all technical research and guides its resulting application to industry, production and service. Supply of nuclear energy is controlled if not monopolized by a government commission; the government controls communications by satellites; probably it controls great areas of electronic development. Steering these resources to public use involves their dealing with corporations.

Finally (in this list of illustrations it is anything but exhausted), the government itself, through the Department of Defense and other agencies, is the largest single buyer of corporate products. The resulting so-called "military-industrial complex" has been on the minds, respectively, of the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson administrations. The actual handling of these problems, and the possible measures making their solutions more productive, more practical, more useful and (if pollution and a few other problems are thrown in) less noxious to the community become matters of first importance--tasks, in fact, for political scientists.

Tasks, indeed, which cry out for performance. The complexity of these relationships, the actual process daily going forward as the corporate system increasingly impacts upon or interlocks with the political state covers this sector of the system with currently unpenetrated mystery. Yet the magnitudes of operation, employment, financial and physical resources are enormous, reflected in perhaps two-thirds of the \$186 billion budget proposed to the Congress by the Johnson administration in January of 1968. The philosophy on which, by which, the institutional processes through which the American state demands and pays for corporate product, are understood in barest outline.

Plainly, the political scientist, like the sociologist, has his work cut out for him.

§5. The social responsibilities of corporations

With this background, we can tackle the question of social responsibilities resting on the corporate system. Enough has been said, I think, to make clear that the usual sermon (here omitted) is scarcely adequate. Nor do I attempt more here than to suggest a few of the very broad classes of problem to which corporate managements must increasingly address themselves.

(a) Determination by each corporation of its role

Corporations have become huge, but they steadily grow, extending old functions and pushing out into new. Meanwhile the economy of the United States increasingly becomes a single, vast machine. Whether they like or dislike it, the corporate activities must relate to total conditions--within their community, within their region, within the totality that is the United States.

Thus far there has been little recognition that the corporation has responsibility to this totality. Many corporations, including some very large ones, are locomotives off the track--going anywhere or nowhere without a plan.

Development of over-all plans for communities, regions, and the country as a whole, clearly goes beyond the capacities of any one corporation, though each could put part of their research and development expense to work. Obviously, corporations should stimulate or certainly support the development of planning machinery, for communities, for regions and for the Federal government, calling in the appropriate agencies of the government for that purpose. As exercise in how this can be done, I recommend study of the work of the Commission du Plan developed in France by Pierre Masse. Logical for doing the academic work are the state universities, certainly including those of Kansas and Missouri. It is essentially absurd that some

areas where production is needed--for example, middle and low income housing--should go unattended to while other non-essential, almost frivolous, production is extravagantly pursued.

The greatest and basic preoccupation of corporations is determining how, where and for what purpose capital should be invested. They themselves generate about two-thirds of the new capital invested in industry every year. They also have access to the capital markets and to banks for the balance. Determination of how and where this capital should be applied goes far towards determining the future of each locality, region or, in aggregate, for the country. It should conform to a general, over-all, estimate as to what is the best available use of their capital--what needs doing that is not being done; what products needed that are not being supplied--what frivolous use of capital, such as those increasing the wastes of distribution, can be avoided?

Having determined what should be produced where, geographically and sociologically, should it be used? It can be used to provide employment where employment is needed. It can be decentralized to diminish the strain on overstrained cities and centers. And it should conform to the general lines of local, regional and national plans.

In other words, corporations should consider themselves developers rather than exploiters, given priority to ascertain social needs.

(b) A corporation has responsibility to consider in its operations whether it is contributing to the productivity of the country or merely to its own aggrandizement. If it desires to grow, is growth in size useful? If tempted by "conglomeration," does conglomeration contribute anything when disparate businesses are added to the corporation's central core? If a proposed financial operation makes no real economic contribution--merely enhancing the power of the corporation's management or meaningless concentration of the corporation's power, why do it?

(c) It has social responsibility for the collateral effects of its operations on the community.

If these installations add to the ugliness and degeneration of an area, the corporation has a social responsibility to prevent this. Factual degeneration accomplished by automobile lots, gasoline stations, hideous cacophonies called supermarkets and so forth, is immense--the kind of thing no European community allows.

If competition drives to the lowest cultural standard, then the corporation ought to support laws preventing the cultural depreciation of the neighborhood; if it is not so forced, not to assist in debasing the countryside.

Its advertising and public communication ought to follow the same rule. A sort of Gresham's Law by which the lower standard drives out the better, has pushed American television (which in effect sells advertising space) to unconscionably low levels. Ultimate power rests with the corporations that buy the service, though they have largely delegated it to the advertising agencies. Probably joint action among corporations is needed to reverse the trend but if they do not reverse it, the State is certain to step in and reverse it for them.

(d) The corporation's effect on its men is also part of their responsibility. Conventionally, this is thought of in terms of labor relations; labor unions share responsibility with them. They should be responsible, however, for making employment continuous rather than intermittent, for making working conditions and so forth reasonable. At the moment also, they must deal with the problem of racial discrimination. This means just now more than mere non-discrimination in hiring. It almost necessarily involves participation in training programs so that the heretofore unemployable Negro shall be given and induced to accept the training

permitting him to work. This may mean undertaking by contract apprenticeship and similar training programs.

The “white collar” personnel is beginning to call for attention. Is it desirable to shift junior executives from one community to another, preventing them from striking roots in any community or giving their children a more or less stable background. The fetish of industrial mobility needs to be cross-checked. Making American into a country of migrants is not a good idea.

Finally there is a responsibility to customers. Where customers are buying on credit, this may include a definite attempt not to sell to customers who can not afford the product or should not borrow, usually at high rates of interest. The corporation does have responsibility when it sells unnecessary goods or when it sells to customers who can not afford to carry the freight.

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In all these matters, economists, sociologists and urbanization studies can assist.

The corporation is now a political-economic institution. It must recognize itself as such-- must be as careful of its political-economic record as of its commercial and financial profitability record.

SUGGESTED READING

Note: The corporation is an institution by which private business carries on vast economic activity. It is the controlling form. As the great corporations have grown in size, they have collided with the political institutions of government and their commercial labor policies have intersected the field of social policy determined by government. The result has been a measure of conflict and a measure of agreement, resulting in the present American system of mixed private and public economy and a growing measure of uneasy cooperation or at least agreement on the results to be sought. The result is a radical departure from the old theory of purely free market economy on the one hand and from European socialist theory on the other. This result was achieved partly by theoretical study and partly by political and economic conflict. Some background may be obtained from the following readings:

Cyclopedia of Social Science, New York: Macmillan 1935. Vol. 1, ch. 1, essay by E.R.A. Seligman, What are the Social Sciences?

Bell, Daniel. The End of Ideology. Illinois: Glencoe Free Press especially chs 10, 13, 14.

Berle, A.A. The American Economic Republic. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World 1963 (in paper back). ch. 2 (pp. 36-59); ch. 13 (pp. 189-218)

Shonfeld, Andrew. Modern Capitalism: the changing balance of public and private power. New York: Oxford University Press 1965, especially ch. XII (pp. 298-329)

Galbraith, John Kenneth. The New Industrial State. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin 1967, especially chs. XXVI and XXVII (pp. 296-317)